Table of Contents

| 1 | Introduction | | | | | |
|----|----------------------|---|----|--|--|--|
| | Viol | eta Beširević | | | | |
| | 1.1 | What Brings Schmitt to the Title of the Book | 1 | | | |
| | | 1.1.1 Schmitt's Decisionism (the Theory of Sovereignty) | 2 | | | |
| | | 1.1.2 New Politics of Decisionism | 5 | | | |
| | 1.2 | Outline of the Volume | 7 | | | |
| Pa | rt I T | he Current Rise of Populism: Deconstructing Issues | | | | |
| 2 | Democracy's Deficits | | | | | |
| | Sam | uel Issacharoff | | | | |
| | 2.1 | Introduction | 13 | | | |
| | 2.2 | Participation: Failing Political Parties | 15 | | | |
| | 2.3 | Deliberation: The Weakness of Legislative Branches | 21 | | | |
| | 2.4 | Solidarity: The Threats to Social Cohesion | 25 | | | |
| | 2.5 | Getting It Done | 32 | | | |
| | 2.6 | Conclusion | 34 | | | |
| 3 | Pop | ulism – A Notion Rising above Its Content | 37 | | | |
| | Tibo | Tibor Várady | | | | |
| | 3.1 | Some Introductory Remarks Concerning the Use of the Term 'Populism' | 37 | | | |
| | 3.2 | An Attempt to Find Some Foothold in Legal Practice | 39 | | | |
| | 3.3 | What Is the Opposite of Populism? | 44 | | | |
| | 3.4 | What Is Actually Getting Condemned by the Label 'Populism'? | 47 | | | |
| | 3.5 | Discovery or Simply Denouncement | 50 | | | |
| 4 | Refl | Reflections on the Nature of Populism and the Fragility of Democracy: | | | | |
| | Democracy in Crisis | | | | | |
| | Davi | David M. Rasmussen | | | | |
| | 4.1 | Introduction | 53 | | | |
| | 42 | What Is Populism? An Historical Perspective | 54 | | | |

Table of Contents

| | 4.3 | What | Is Populism? A Normative Perspective | 56 |
|----|---|--------------------------------------|---|-----|
| | 4.4 | The F | ragility of Democracy | 59 |
| 5 | Populism and Nationalism Nenad Miščević | | | 61 |
| | 5.1 | Introd | luction | 61 |
| | 5.2 | Nationalists of All Countries Unite! | | |
| | | 5.2.1 | Introductory Remarks | 63 |
| | | 5.2.2 | Patriotism | 66 |
| | | | 5.2.2.1 The Low-Profile Patriotism | 67 |
| | | | 5.2.2.2 The High-Profile Patriotism | 67 |
| | | 5.2.3 | Classical Strong Ethnic Nationalism (Nativism) | 68 |
| | | 5.2.4 | Moderate Statist Nationalism | 71 |
| | | 5.2.5 | Liberal Nationalism | 74 |
| | | 5.2.6 | Communitarianism and 'Transnational Nationalism' | 75 |
| | | 5.2.7 | Cosmopolitanism | 78 |
| | 5.3 | The C | urious Case of Croatia | 80 |
| | | 5.3.1 | Approaches and Disagreements | 80 |
| | | 5.3.2 | Some Populist Actors | 82 |
| | | 5.3.3 | The Riddle: Why Croatia Does Not Have a Strong Right-Wing | |
| | | | Populist Party | 83 |
| | 5.4 | Concl | usion: A New Playground | 87 |
| Pa | rt II C | Compar | ative Populism: Case Studies | |
| 6 | • | nd 'Illi l ás Bozó | beral Democracy': The Case of Hungary ki | 93 |
| | 6.1 | Introd | luction | 93 |
| | 6.2 | | Illiberal Democracy' Is Not Democracy | 94 |
| | 6.3 | • | arian 'Exceptionalism' | 98 |
| | 6.4 | Concl | • | 104 |
| 7 | Populism, Free Speech and the Anti-Entrenchment Principle <i>Adam Shinar</i> | | | |
| | 7.1 | Introd | luction | 107 |
| | 7.2 | Israel and the Protection of Speech | | |

| | 7.3 | The Regulation of Speech Resources in Israel – Public Funding of Pa | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------|--|--|-----|--|--|--|
| | | vate E | xpression | 112 | | | |
| | 7.4 | The A | nti-Entrenchment Principle | 115 | | | |
| | | 7.4.1 | The Difficulty with the Existing Legal Framework | 115 | | | |
| | | 7.4.2 | State and Government | 116 | | | |
| | | 7.4.3 | The Anti-Entrenchment Principle | 118 | | | |
| | | 7.4.4 | How to Apply the Anti-Entrenchment Principle? | 122 | | | |
| | 7.5 | Concl | usion | 124 | | | |
| 8 | Tran | sformi | ng Populism – From Protest Vote to Ruling Ideology: The Case | | | | |
| | of Se | | | 125 | | | |
| | Duša | n Spaso | jević | | | | |
| | 8.1 | Introd | luction | 125 | | | |
| | 8.2 | Ideation | onal Understanding of Populism | 127 | | | |
| | 8.3 | 8.3 The Case of Serbian Progressive Party: Once Radical and Now Progressive Party: Once Pa | | | | | |
| | | sive - | Is It the Same Populism? | 129 | | | |
| | | 8.3.1 | Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) – The Opposition Phase | 129 | | | |
| | | 8.3.2 | Incumbent Populism – How Does It Work? | 133 | | | |
| | 8.4 | Concl | uding Remarks | 137 | | | |
| Pa | rt III | Courts | Under the Populist Challenge | | | | |
| 9 | Pola | Poland: From Paradigm to Pariah? Facts and Interpretations of Polish | | | | | |
| | Constitutional Crisis | | | | | | |
| | Marc | in Mate | ezak | | | | |
| | 9.1 | 9.1 Introduction | | 141 | | | |
| | 9.2 | Facts | | 142 | | | |
| | | 9.2.1 | The First Stage | 142 | | | |
| | | 9.2.2 | The Second Stage | 145 | | | |
| | 9.3 | Interp | retations | 149 | | | |
| | | 9.3.1 | The Historical Explanation | 149 | | | |
| | | 9.3.2 | The Legal Explanation | 152 | | | |
| | | 9.3.3 | The Sociological Explanation | 156 | | | |
| | 9.4 | Concl | usion | 159 | | | |

| 10 | Populism and the Turkish Constitutional Court: From a Game Broker to | | | |
|----|---|---|-----|--|
| | a Stra | a Strategic Compromiser Bertil Emrah Oder | | |
| | Bertil | | | |
| | 10.1 | Introduction | 161 | |
| | 10.2 | The Constitutional Court in High-Profile Cases and Populism: The | | |
| | | Game Broker | 163 | |
| | 10.3 | The Constitutional Court's Judicial Populism and Popularity | 165 | |
| | 10.4 | The Fragile Popularity of the Court: Strategically Supportive and | | |
| | | Defiant Stances after the Coup Attempt in 2016 | 167 | |
| | | 10.4.1 Constitutional Review of Emergency Decrees | 168 | |
| | | 10.4.2 Journalism Cases as a Judicial Battle Field | 169 | |
| | | 10.4.3 Criminal Law on Insulting the President of the State | 174 | |
| | 10.5 | Conclusion | 175 | |
| 11 | Romania: From Constitutional Democracy to Constitutional Decay? Simina Tanasescu | | | |
| | 11.1 | Introduction | 177 | |
| | 11.2 | On Populism and Constitutional Democracy | 177 | |
| | 11.3 | Romania: A Still Fragile Democratic Transition | 181 | |
| | 11.4 | Can Constitutional Adjudication Become an Instrument of Judicial | | |
| | | Populism? | 184 | |
| | | 11.4.1 Deriding Fundamental Rights | 185 | |
| | | 11.4.2 Disdaining Checks and Balances | 186 | |
| | 11.5 | Concluding Remarks | 190 | |
| 12 | If Sch | nmitt Were Alive Adjusting Constitutional Review to Populist Rule | | |
| | | n Serbia | | |
| | Viole | ta Beširević | | |
| | 12.1 | Introduction | 193 | |
| | 12.2 | A Note on Transition in Serbia | 195 | |
| | 12.3 | A Silent Feature of the Constitutional Court | 197 | |
| | 12.4 | Constitutional Court in Populist Politics | 198 | |
| | | 12.4.1 Constitutional Review of Kosovo's Knot: If Schmitt Were | | |
| | | Alive | 200 | |
| | | 12.4.2 Judicial Endorsement of 'Discriminatory Legalism' | 202 | |

| | 12.4.3 | Rights Adjudication: What Stands behind the Court's | | |
|------|------------|---|-----|--|
| | | Assertiveness | 204 | |
| 12.5 | Conclusion | | 206 | |