Virtual Things, Virtual Possessio, and Possessory Protection Thereof

Radonjić, Aleksa (2021) Virtual Things, Virtual Possessio, and Possessory Protection Thereof. In: Property Law Perspectives VII / Jill Robbie and Bram Akkermans (eds.). Maastricht law series (17). Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, pp. 29-42. ISBN 978-94-6236-181-2

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Abstract

This paper is published in Property Law Perspetives, 2020, Bram Akkermans and Jill Robie (eds.), accessible at: https://www.boomdenhaag.nl/en/webshop/property-law-perspectives-vii The purpose of this paper is to check the hypothesis that virtual things are functionally similar to things in real life, and thus eligible to be the object of possessio, and possessory protection. Under the functional similarity, I mean that virtual things share some key characteristics with physical things, and that persons treat them, and use them in ways which are similar to the ways which they treat and use physical things, and that they have the same or similar functions or purposes as physical things. In order to reach the definition of a virtual thing I will analyse relevant literature. After critically assessing the definitions and descriptions offered therein, I will offer my view on what are the essential elements of the notion of virtual thing. I will argue, based on these key elements, that there is significant functional similarity between the virtual things, and their real-world relatives. The established similarity does not mean that property law should be applied to virtual things without reservations. It does not mean that the users of virtual things are/should be the owners of virtual things just because these are functionally similar to real-world things. Defining virtual things is a separate issue from the issue of the allocation of the entitlements over them. However, defining them is a pre-condition for a meaningful discussion about the entitlements. The question of ownership and other entitlements over these objects has to be treated separately, and this exceeds the scope of this paper. On the other hand, I acknowledge that users of virtual things have legitimate interests which need to be protected. First and foremost, they need to be protected from the dispossession of the virtual things they control. That is why I will contend that functional similarity between real-world things and virtual things makes the latter eligible to be the objects of possessio. Consequently, possessory protection of possessio of virtual things should be granted which is the way to protect certain legitimate interests of users of virtual things without prejudice to the entitlements over these objects.

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